The normative value of major powers’ veto power in international organizations has always been subject to controversy. Supporters demonstrate the positive significance of granting veto power to major powers by referring to historical rights, the symmetry of rights and duties, and its functional utilities. Opponents raise their doubts by arguing that veto power goes against the principle of sovereign equality, that veto power is prone to being abused in practice, and that it impedes international organizations from playing a more active role. These opposing opinions are based on different value systems, which makes dialogue between them almost impossible. The political feature of international organizations determines that the subjectivity and proactivity of international organizations have limits and that their international activities should have a sense of boundaries, while the legal attributes of international organizations enable them to elevate their action capacity by optimizing institutional structures. Major powers’ veto power is part of the centralizing decision-making rules in international organizations, and its fundamental value lies in ensuring the moderateness as well as activeness of organizations. Specific rules on major powers’ veto power should be orientated to achieve an optimal balance between the efficiency of decision-making and executability of resolutions premised on an accurate understanding of the nature of issue areas, the goal of the organization, and the inter-member power structure. Those dimensions should guide the design of constitutional elements (e.g., the players, issue areas, and procedures) of major powers’ veto power in international organizations.