Successive U.S. administrations from Eisenhower to Johnson attempted to prevent Israel from developing nuclear weapons. However, due to misperception, domestic political constraints, and the lack of policy leverage and policy consistence, they ultimately missed the best timing of stopping the Israeli nuclear program. The U.S. failure as regards Israel was a reflection of a series of inherent dilemmas in its non-proliferation policy, such as the contradiction between moral objectives and materialistic interests, the “gap” between policy goals and policy leverage, etc. In principle, the U.S. did not want any other country to acquire nuclear weapons so as to maintain its monopoly status and preserve its security interests, which was the essence of its postwar non-proliferation policy. In reality, however, the U.S. had to carry out a “selective” policy in accordance with its own interests and capabilities. This is not so much a “double standard” policy as a typical “pragmatic” or “opportunistic” policy, as it has manifested itself more in the policy consequences of non-proliferation than in the policy choices themselves.